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SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY AND FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING IN 
SOFTWARE PATENTS 
Michael Xun Liu 
Subject matter eligibility and functional claiming are considered 
separate doctrines in patent law. Conceptually, subject matter 
eligibility relates to the types of ideas that can be patented, whereas 
limits on functional claiming constrain how patentees can claim 
their inventions. In practice, however, patents that recite functional 
claims are also more likely to be invalidated for failing to recite 
patentable subject matter. This trend is especially prevalent in the 
software field, where courts often hold the function or end result of 
a computer program represents an unpatentable abstract idea. 
Critics argue this judicial approach to software patents 
improperly conflates “what is patentable” with “how patentees can 
claim their inventions.” To rein in this practice, Congress has 
introduced legislation that would narrow judicial authority over 
patentable subject matter. The current legislative proposals, 
however, do not address underlying policy issues surrounding 
functional claims in software patents. They will also prevent courts 
from invalidating patents that broadly preempt future innovation. 
Instead of limiting judicial authority over patentable subject matter, 
policymakers should address functional software claims more 
directly, such as adopting a more flexible interpretation of means-
plus-function claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) or delegating 
rulemaking authority to the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Modern software can perform functions that few could imagine 
in previous decades. A typical smartphone can run applications that 
navigate drivers, pay for coffee, hail a rideshare, and even diagnose 
diseases. Programmers should certainly have incentives to dream up 
new ways to make life easier and work more productive. The hard 
question for policymakers, however, is whether those incentives 
should be in the form of patent rights and, if so, how extensive those 
rights should be. In a world that depends on software at every turn, 
it may seem inconceivable that basic questions about software 
patentability remain unsettled. Yet the extent to which software is 
patentable and the permissible scope of software claims are both still 
hotly debated. While these questions have never been definitively 
resolved, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS 
Bank International brought them squarely back into the limelight.1 
The ensuing controversy has generated renewed calls for a 
legislative solution to software patents.2 
                                                 
 1 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014); see Jeffrey A. 
Lefstin et al., Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 
101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 555), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050093. 
 2 See infra Section V. 
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To understand why software patents pose unique challenges for 
courts and legislators, it helps to start with a few foundational 
concepts. Congress is constitutionally empowered to “promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing . . . inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”3 But 
that does not mean all scientific advancements are patentable or 
inventors own every aspect of their discovery. Courts and 
policymakers have long recognized some patents do little to 
promote scientific or technological progress and may even hinder 
subsequent innovation. 
First, most would agree that limits should exist for patentable 
subject matter, which are the types of discoveries eligible for 
patenting. For instance, natural laws and abstract ideas cannot be 
patented.4 Thus, even the discoverer of groundbreaking ideas like 
Bernoulli’s principle or the theory of relativity cannot claim the 
exclusive use of those concepts.5 Second, even if the invention falls 
within the realm of patentable subject matter, the law further 
constrains the scope of the inventor’s resulting patent right.6 Ideally, 
the inventor’s exclusive right should be commensurate with their 
contribution to technology.7 Historically, one way courts limited 
patent scope is by prohibiting attempts to claim the function of a 
device or process.8 The rationale behind this prohibition is that 
functional claims preclude others from developing new and different 
ways of performing the same function.9 
To illustrate these limits on patent eligibility and scope, consider 
a hypothetical patent on an airplane. According to Bernoulli’s 
principle, fast moving fluids exert lower pressure than slower 
moving fluids.10 Using this principle, an airplane generates lift by 
                                                 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 4 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
 5 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 6 Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (“A claim broader 
than the actual invention of the patentee is, for that very reason, upon the 
principles of the common law, utterly void, and the patent is a nullity.”). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 10 (1946). 
 9 Id. 
 10 BERNOULLI’S PRINCIPLE, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. 4 (2010), 
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/ default/files/atoms/files/bernoulli_principle_k-4.pdf. 
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forcing the air above its wing to travel faster than the air below its 
wing.11 In this hypothetical, the inventor is the first person to learn 
how to harness Bernoulli’s principle to generate lift, and she invents 
a working propeller plane based on this understanding. Bernoulli’s 
principle is a natural law that cannot be patented.12 An airplane, 
however, is a machine that applies the natural law and therefore falls 
within the realm of patent-eligible subject matter.13 
Even though an airplane is patent-eligible, there are still limits 
on how the inventor can claim her invention. For instance, our 
hypothetical inventor might claim “a machine with a fuselage, fixed 
wings, and a propeller” arranged in a specific way. This is an 
accurate description of her invention because it covers the design 
(i.e., a propeller plane) she created. Alternatively, the inventor might 
claim “a machine with a fuselage and a means for applying 
Bernoulli’s principle to fly.” From a technical and linguistic 
perspective, this second claim is also an accurate description of her 
invention. The difference, however, is the second claim is directed 
to the function of an airplane, but not how it performs the function. 
As a result, the literal scope of the second claim extends beyond 
propeller planes or their obvious variants.14 Instead, the claim 
language also covers totally different machines that apply 
Bernoulli’s principle to fly, such as helicopters. 
In theory, subject matter eligibility addresses what ideas can be 
patented, and limits on functional claiming constrain how those 
ideas can be patented. These issues are governed by separate 
statutory provisions. In addressing subject matter eligibility, 35 
U.S.C. § 101 states any “new or useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter” is patentable.15 By contrast, 
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) limits the scope of functional claims.16 Under 
§ 112(f), if a patentee drafts a claim “as a means or step for 
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, 
material, or acts in support thereof,” the claim will be construed to 
                                                 
 11 Id. at 5. 
 12 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 13 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852). 
 14 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 10 (1946). 
 15 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 16 Id. § 112(f). 
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cover only what is disclosed in the specifications.17 That way, if a 
patent describes a propeller plane but claims “a machine with a 
fuselage and a means for applying Bernoulli’s principle to fly,” 
§ 112(f) will limit the claim to propeller planes and their 
equivalents.18 
In reality, the distinction between “what is patentable?” and 
“how can it be patented?” is not always so clear. We might say a 
patent on “a machine that applies Bernoulli’s principle to fly” recites 
a patent-eligible idea because it is directed to an airplane but claims 
the idea in an impermissible manner because it is too broad. Some 
might also argue the claim is too abstract to be patentable.19 That is 
because it covers an idea for how Bernoulli’s principle can be used 
without reciting any technical aspects of the machine’s design or 
components.20 In other words, the claim is directed to the idea of 
using a natural law in the technological environment of a “flying 
machine,” but it does not cover any specific technology for actually 
implementing the idea.21 
Accordingly, the same claim might be abstract or functional 
depending on how we frame the analysis. This distinction, however, 
has real consequences. If a claim is abstract, then it is invalid.22 By 
contrast, if the claim is non-abstract but functional, then its scope is 
                                                 
 17 Id. 
 18 As the Federal Circuit explained in Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC: 
Congress struck a balance in allowing patentees to express a claim 
limitation by reciting a function to be performed rather than by reciting 
structure for performing that function, while placing specific constraints 
on how such a limitation is to be construed, namely, by restricting the 
scope of coverage to only the structure, materials, or acts described in 
the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and 
equivalents thereof. 
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 19 Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“[E]ssentially result–focused, functional character of claim language has been a 
frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101 . . . .”). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 1354 (“[L]imiting the claims to the particular technological 
environment of power–grid monitoring is, without more, insufficient to transform 
them into patent–eligible applications of the abstract idea at their core.”). 
 22 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014). 
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limited to the “corresponding structure, material, or acts described 
in the specification and equivalents thereof.”23 
This distinction is particularly hard to make for software patents. 
On a fundamental level, software can be characterized as a set of 
instructions or algorithms, which the Supreme Court has held to be 
abstract.24 Nevertheless, software is always embodied in some 
physical form, whether it is stored in a computer readable medium 
(i.e. a hard-drive) or running on an electronic device.25 As a result, 
patentees often try to claim the implementation of software on 
physical devices.26 For example, a typical software patent might 
recite “a computer readable medium containing program 
instructions” to perform a set of functions.27 Although this claim is 
technically directed to a physical device, one could argue taking a 
set of instructions and saying “apply it on a computer” is no less 
abstract than the instructions themselves. 
At the same time, software patents also raise functional claiming 
issues. Software claims are rarely limited to specific code and are 
usually directed to the software’s higher-level functions.28 Such 
claims can preclude other programmers from writing different code 
to perform the same function.29 Often, software patents are asserted 
against later-developed programs that perform the claimed function 
but operate in fundamentally different ways, thus raising concerns 
that software patents hinder innovation or serve as tools for extorting 
businesses through litigation.30 
                                                 
 23 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2011); see Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347. 
 24 Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and the 
Problem of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1399, 
1455–56 (2013); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972). 
 25 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (“Nearly every computer will include a 
‘communications controller’ and ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the 
basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method 
claims.”). 
 26 Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 919–22. 
 27 Id. at 920. 
 28 Id. at 919–22. 
 29 See id. at 923. 
 30 See James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis is Really a Software Patent Crisis, 
WASH. POST (Sep. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the–
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Despite uncertainty surrounding their validity and scope, the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) took a liberal approach to 
software patents throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.31 Within that 
time, the agency also issued many patents with functional claim 
language.32 By 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
estimated over half of all issued patents were related to software.33 
Moreover, software patents accounted for the majority of patent 
lawsuit filings.34 Around the same time, another study concluded 
most litigated patents used some form of functional claiming.35 
This all changed in 2014 with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alice v. CLS Bank,36 which dialed back software patents 
significantly.37 In Alice, the Court held a computer-implemented 
method of mitigating financial risk was not patent-eligible even 
though the claims included hardware components. 38 After Alice, 
lower courts frequently invalidated functional software claims under 
§ 101.39 The Federal Circuit observed “the essentially result-
focused, functional character of claim language has been a frequent 
feature of claims held ineligible under § 101.”40 In another decision, 
the court referenced the “foundational patent law principle[] that a 
result, even an innovative result, is not itself patentable.”41 Some 
judges and practitioners, however, criticize these decisions for 
                                                 
switch/wp/2013/09/03/the–patent–troll–crisis–is–really–a–software–patent–
crisis/?utm_term=.8909c5855d14. 
 31 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 13 (2013). 
 32 See Colleen V. Chien & Aashish R. Karkhanis, Functional Claiming and 
Software Patents, 40–41 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. L., Working Paper No. 06-13, 
2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2215867. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id.; Keith N. Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with 
Applications, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1117, 1126 (2016). 
 35 See Chien & Karkhanis, supra note 32, at 40–41. 
 36 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 37 See id. at 2360. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Case Change the Law 
by Saying Nothing?, 71 VAND. L. REV. 765, 774 (2018). 
 40 Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 41 Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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conflating distinct inquiries under § 101 and § 112.42 And Congress 
has introduced legislative amendments that would prohibit courts 
from considering any § 112 issues in the patent eligibility analysis.43 
Although Alice brought judicial and Congressional attention to 
software patents, the current debate over § 101 also reflects decades-
long concerns about the nature of software and how it should be 
treated under patent law. In this Article, I show how judicial 
concerns about functional software claims underpin the post-Alice 
approach to software patent eligibility. I argue that differing 
opinions on functional claiming help explain inconsistencies in the 
Federal Circuit’s recent § 101 decisions. In particular, courts have 
held that software functions are inherently abstract and ineligible.44 
By contrast, others reason software functions are not abstract per se 
and will look beyond the claim language to evaluate whether the 
claimed software functions are tied to technological 
improvements.45 
I also explain why legislative proposals to amend § 101 should 
address long-standing issues relating to functional software claims. 
The current legislative proposals, however, largely fail to do so. 
Instead, the leading proposals would prohibit courts and the PTO 
from rejecting broad, functional software patents without resolving 
underlying concerns about such patents, including their unclear 
scope and potential to preempt subsequent innovation. I also identify 
one proposal that, despite its flaws, has the potential to improve 
                                                 
 42 See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016); AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N., AIPLA LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSAL AND REPORT ON PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 3–4 (2017) 
[hereinafter AIPLA PROPOSAL], https://www.aipla.org/docs/default-
source/uploadedfiles/documents/resources2/reports/2017aipladirect/documents/a
ipla-report-on-101-reform-5-19-17-errata.pdf?sfvrsn=138c9ce7_1. 
 43 See Restoring America’s Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018, H.R. 6264, 
115th Cong. § 7(c) (2d Sess. 2018); see also infra Section V. 
 44 See, e.g., Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 
1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016). 
 45 See Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1295; Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 
F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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uniformity and certainty for software patents.46 This proposal would 
require courts to analyze functional software claims under 
§ 112(f)—or a new provision to similar effect—instead of 
invalidating the claims altogether.47 The caveat is it will require 
guidelines on what types of disclosures are sufficient to support 
functional software claiming. Institutionally, the PTO is likely better 
suited to establish such guidelines. 
This Article proceeds in five sections. Section II provides an 
overview of the evolution of judicial limits on subject matter 
eligibility and functional claiming through nineteenth century 
judicial decisions. It also explains why the 1952 Patent Act included 
a legislative compromise for functional claims. Section III shows 
how software patents create conceptual difficulties for both patent 
eligibility and functional claiming analysis. This section also 
reviews how Congress and the courts tried—and failed—to develop 
a uniform framework for analyzing the patentability of software. 
Section IV discusses the judicial approach to software patents after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice. It shows how differing views 
on the nature of software functions underpin the post-Alice approach 
to software patent eligibility. Finally, Section V discusses the 
implications for the proposed legislative reform of § 101. 
II.  BACKGROUND ON SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY AND 
FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING 
The exclusive right of an inventor “depends entirely upon the 
provisions of the acts of Congress.”48 Perhaps counterintuitively, the 
statutes provide little guidance on what is patentable.49 Congress has 
                                                 
 46 See Benjamin C. Stasa & David C. Berry, Fixing Patent Eligibility by 
Limiting Scope to Disclosed Embodiments, PATENTLYO (June 4, 2018), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/06/eligibility-disclosed-embodiments.html. 
 47 See id. 
 48 See William B. Whitney, Patentable Processes, 19 HARV. L. REV. 30, 30 
(1905). 
 49 One author of the 1952 Patent Act commented: 
While patents are creatures of statute, the entire body of patent law is 
much fuller than the statute itself, including a vast amount of case 
material on subjects such as invention and infringement which are dealt 
with by the statute only in general terms. Consequently, a discussion of 
the statute alone cannot be a complete dissertation on patent law. 
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never explained the meaning of terms like “process” or “machine” 
under § 101, nor has it delegated authority to the Patent Office to 
interpret the patent statutes through regulation.50 As a result, most 
substantive standards for patentability are judicially created.51 
Indeed, U.S. patent law has largely been “built upon judicial 
interpretation of elliptical statutory phrases, or is devoid of any 
statutory basis whatsoever.”52 
This section starts with nineteenth century judicial decisions that 
still guide the modern judicial approach to patent eligibility and 
functional claiming. Before the 1952 Patent Act, courts would 
invalidate claims altogether if the claims were either abstract or 
purely functional.53 That changed with the 1952 Patent Act, through 
which Congress tried to soften the impact of functional claiming 
under § 112(f).54 The idea was to allow functional claims, but limit 
their scope to the specific embodiments disclosed in the patent.55 
Courts, however, interpreted § 112(f) to cover only patents that 
invoked this statutory provision through specific claim language.56 
This approach allowed many patents, especially in the software 
field, to use functional claim language without triggering the 
narrowing effects of § 112(f).57 
A. Common Law Origins 
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, courts began to 
distinguish between unpatentable “principles” and specific 
                                                 
P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 161, 162 (1993). 
 50 See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated en banc on 
other grounds, 328 F. App’x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 51 See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. 
L. REV. 51, 54 (2010). 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Lemley, supra note 26, at 914–15. 
 54 See id. at 915–16. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 
1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Flo Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 
1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 57 Lemley, supra note 26, at 923–24. 
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applications of such principles.58 In Le Roy v. Tatham,59 the Supreme 
Court explained that “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental 
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no 
one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”60 By contrast, 
“[a] new property discovered in matter, when practically applied, in 
the construction of a useful article of commerce or manufacture, is 
patentable.”61 To illustrate this distinction, the Court explained that:  
Through the agency of machinery a new steam power may be said to 
have been generated. But no one can appropriate this power exclusively 
to himself, under the patent laws. The same may be said of electricity, 
and of any other power in nature, which is alike open to all . . . .62 
Around the same time, courts developed a closely related 
doctrine to prohibit functional claiming. Early decisions often called 
this the “function of the machine” doctrine, and this doctrine held 
that machines could only be patented based on their components or 
design, not on the result or effect of a machine’s operation.63 The 
doctrine can be traced back to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Corning v. Burden,64 where the court held an inventor could not 
patent “the function of a machine, or the effect produced by it on the 
material subjected to the action of the machine.”65 The Court 
reasoned the scope of functional claims exceeds the inventor’s 
contribution to the technical field.66 That is, functional claim 
language allows the inventor to “describe a machine which will 
perform a certain function, and then claim the function itself, and all 
other machines that may be invented to perform the same 
function.”67 
Historically, the distinction between functional claiming and 
subject matter eligibility has never been clear. Nineteenth century 
                                                 
 58 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852); Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 
727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840). 
 59 Le Roy, 55 U.S. 156. 
 60 Id. at 175. 
 61 Id. (emphasis added). 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 197 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 64 Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252 (1853). 
 65 Id. at 268. 
 66 See id. 
 67 Id. at 269. 
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cases that invalidate patents for reciting abstract principles are often 
based, at least in part, on functional claim language.68 This is partly 
because the distinction between functional claiming and subject 
matter eligibility was hardly significant at that time. Before the 1952 
Patent Act, courts would invalidate patents if they claimed either 
“the function of a machine” or ineligible subject matter.69 For 
example, in Wyeth v. Stone, the court invalidated a claim that 
covered any machine for cutting ice.70 Justice Story, riding circuit, 
reasoned that “[n]o man can have a right to cut ice by all means and 
methods.”71 Although a machine that cuts ice is neither an abstract 
principle nor a natural law, Justice Story nevertheless characterized 
the claim as “an art or principle in the abstract” because it did not 
relate to “any particular method or machinery” for cutting ice.72 
Even in the renowned case of O’Reilly v. Morse,73 it is not 
entirely clear how much weight the Supreme Court placed on 
functional claiming concerns.74 There, the Supreme Court held 
Samuel Morse could not patent the use of electric current to generate 
characters or signs at a remote location, which is the principle 
behind the telegraph.75 Morse’s patent recited the following 
invention: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of 
machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the 
essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric 
or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed 
for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any 
distances, being a new application of that power of which I claim to be 
the first inventor or discoverer.76 
As his patent makes explicit, Morse tried to claim the use of 
electromagnetism to generate intelligible characters at a distance, 
                                                 
 68 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840); O’Reilly 
v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
 69 Wyeth, 30 F. Cas. at 727; Lemley, supra note 26, at 914–15. 
 70 Wyeth, 30 F. Cas. at 727. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
 74 See generally id. 
 75 See id. at 113. 
 76 Id. at 112. 
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not just a specific machine for doing so.77 The Supreme Court 
observed that the claim would give Morse the “exclusive right to 
every improvement where the motive power is the electric or 
galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters at a distance.”78 Morse’s patent could be 
asserted against future inventors who “discover[ed] a mode of 
writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic 
current, without using any part of the process or combination set 
forth in the plaintiff’s specification.”79 As a result, the Court held 
that Morse’s “claim is too broad, and not warranted by law.”80 
O’Reilly v. Morse remains a cornerstone of judicial 
interpretations of patentable subject matter.81 It is cited in numerous 
Supreme Court decisions on patent eligibility, usually for the 
proposition that scientific principles cannot be patented.82 The 
Federal Circuit has likewise described O’Reilly v. Morse as a patent 
eligibility case.83 But is this characterization accurate? Samuel 
Morse tried to patent the use of electromagnetism in telegraphy. 
Electromagnetism does not fit within any of the categories of patent-
eligible subject matter. Nor is electromagnetism “new,” since it 
existed in nature long before Samuel Morse harnessed its power to 
transmit messages. But Morse’s patent recites more than the bare 
principles of electromagnetism. Samuel Morse applied 
electromagnetism to generate characters at a remote location, which 
is a phenomenon that does not occur in nature and cannot exist 
                                                 
 77 See id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 113. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 85 (2012); Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972). 
 82 See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354; Mayo, 566 U.S. at 85; Parker, 437 U.S. 
at 592; Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 68. 
 83 See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 
2018); Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1309 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2016); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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without human ingenuity.84 Further, converting electrical impulses 
to legible characters is plainly a “process,” at least in common 
parlance.85 
Viewed this way, the rationale in Morse is more consistent with 
the judicial prohibition against functional claiming. Morse’s patent 
was directed to the function of generating characters at a distance 
using electricity without regard to the specific machine or process 
for doing so. The Court explained that “[i]f this claim can be 
maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery the result 
is accomplished.”86 Future inventors might develop a device that is 
“less complicated[,] . . . less expensive in construction, and in its 
operation. But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could 
not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission 
of this patentee.”87 Indeed, the Supreme Court upheld different 
claims in Morse’s patent that limited the claimed method to the 
process described in patent specifications.88 
Aside from its tendency to blur into a subject matter eligibility 
analysis, the judicial bar on functional claims presented other 
conceptual difficulties as it evolved in the nineteenth century. First, 
there is tension between the prohibition on functional claiming and 
how courts interpret process patents. In O’Reilly v. Morse, the 
Supreme Court observed that Morse’s patent improperly preempts 
future machines from performing the claimed process of generating 
                                                 
 84 See Morse, 56 U.S. 62. 
 85 See Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1320 
(2012) (summarizing early American process patents); see also Cochrane v. 
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) (“If [a process is] new and useful, it is just as 
patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an 
art.”). 
 86 Morse, 56 U.S. at 113. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See, e.g., id. at 112 (“We perceive no well–founded objection to the 
description which is given of the whole invention and its separate parts, nor to his 
right to a patent for the first seven inventions set forth in the specification of his 
claims.”). The Supreme Court’s later decision in the Telephone Cases support this 
interpretation. Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 8 S. Ct. 778, 785 (1888) (upholding 
Alexander Graham Bell’s patent on a process of transmitting speech using 
electricity because the claim was limited to the particular process discussed in the 
patent). 
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characters at a distance using electromagnetism.89 But all process 
patents preempt others from using different machines to achieve the 
same result, including innovative machines that might perform the 
same process faster and cheaper.90 In Cochrane v. Deener,91 the 
Supreme Court found the defendants infringed a process patent for 
manufacturing flour, despite using a different machine.92 The Court 
noted “a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular 
form of the instrumentalities used” and “[i]f one of the steps of a 
process be that a certain substance is to be reduced to a powder, it 
may not be at all material what instrument or machinery is used to 
effect that object, whether a hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a 
mill.”93 
Second, the notion of what constitutes a functional claim can be 
elusive.94 Even structural components are defined by their function 
to some extent.95 Suppose that, in my hypothetical example of an 
airplane patent, the inventor claims “a flying machine with a 
fuselage, two wings, and a propeller.” At first glance, nothing about 
this claim seems “functional,” as it apparently describes the physical 
components of a propeller plane. But in reality, whether this claim 
is functional depends on how the patent defines the term “propeller.” 
Conceivably, the patent might broadly define the term as “a device 
that propels,” in which case the claim would still cover future 
innovations such as jet engines and other innovative means of 
propelling a plane. Even common definitions of “propeller” still 
include functional aspects. For instance, Merriam-Webster defines 
the term “propeller” as a device with rotating blades that “forms part 
                                                 
 89 Morse, 56 U.S. at 113. 
 90 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787 (1876). 
 91 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876). 
 92 Id. at 787–90. 
 93 Id. at 787–88. 
 94 Application of Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 263 n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (“One of the 
primary problems we have in coming to grips with the instant rejection is in what 
sense the word ‘functional’ is being used. Few words in patent law have acquired 
more diverse meanings than the word ‘functional.’”). 
 95 B. L. Zangwill, Comments on Means Claims and Expressions, 34 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 36, 36 (1952) (“[T]here is little, if anything, to guide us as to where 
‘structure’ ends and ‘function’ begins, or even why one is always to be preferred 
to the other.”). 
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of a helical surface and that is used to propel a vehicle.”96 
Nevertheless, terms like “propeller” usually connote a minimum 
level of structure, even if such terms have functional aspects as 
well.97 As described in Section III, however, such structural 
elements fall away entirely for software.98 
By the early twentieth century, courts shifted towards a 
somewhat different rationale for invalidating functional claims. 
Rather than focusing on how functional claims tie up natural laws 
or abstract ideas, courts reasoned that functional claims do not 
define the scope of the invention with adequate clarity.99 This 
reasoning is based on a long-standing patent law doctrine commonly 
known as definiteness.100 As early as the Patent Act of 1790, patents 
were required to describe the invention and “distinguish the 
invention or discovery from other things before known and used.”101 
Similarly, the Patent Act of 1870 required claims that “particularly 
point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination 
which he claims as his invention or discovery . . . .”102 
In Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,103 the 
Supreme Court relied on the definiteness requirement to hold that 
patents cannot claim an invention “in terms of what it will do rather 
than in terms of its own physical characteristics or its arrangement 
in the new combination apparatus.”104 By claiming the invention in 
terms of “what it will do,” the Court found functional claiming 
undermines at least three policies rationales for the definiteness 
requirement: 
1. That the Government may know what they have granted and what will 
become public property when the term of the monopoly expires. 
                                                 
 96 Propeller, MERRIAM–WEBSTER (emphasis added), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/propeller (last visited Aug. 8, 2018). 
 97 See Lemley, supra note 26, at 960. 
 98 See infra § III.B. 
 99 See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9 (1946); 
Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 256–57 (1928). 
 100 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124–25 (2014). 
 101 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 110. 
 102 William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 
46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 760 (1948). 
 103 Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 9. 
 104 Id. at 9. 
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2. That licensed persons desiring to practice the invention may know, 
during the term, how to make, construct, and use the invention. 
3. That other inventors may know what part of the field of invention is 
unoccupied.105 
As a result, the claim in Halliburton was not invalidated because 
it was abstract, but because it failed to adequately describe the scope 
of the invention.106 Stated otherwise, the Court found that functional 
claims fail to meet a notice requirement.107 Although Halliburton 
was understood to have ended the practice of functional claiming, 
this prohibition on functional claiming would soon be legislatively 
abrogated by the 1952 Patent Act.108 
B. The 1952 Patent Act 
In 1926, Congress started to codify the laws of the United States 
into fifty titles according to subject matter, which ultimately 
produced the United States Code.109 The 1952 Patent Act was part 
of this “comprehensive program of revising and enacting into law 
all of the titles of the United States Code.”110 Congress, however, 
went beyond codifying existing patent statutes and judicial 
decisions; it also revised patent law in several important respects.111 
Among other changes, the 1952 Patent Act divided patentable 
subject matter and novelty into two statutory sections: § 101 and 
§ 102, respectively.112 The law also created § 103, which states that 
only non-obvious inventions can be patented.113 
                                                 
 105 Id. at 10. 
 106 Id. at 12. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Lemley, supra note 26, at 915. 
 109 Detailed Guide to the United States Code, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION 
COUNSEL, http://uscode.house.gov/detailed_guide.xhtml (last visited July 31, 
2018). 
 110 H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 1 (1952) (Conf. Rep.). 
 111 Federico, supra note 49, at 164. 
 112 Id. at 176. 
 113 L. James Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the 
Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 671–72 (1955); H.R. REP. NO. 
1923, at 7 (1952) (Conf. Rep.) (“An invention which has been made, and which 
is new in the sense that the same thing has not been made before, may still not be 
patentable if the difference between the new thing and what was known before is 
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The 1952 Patent Act, however, did not substantively alter the 
statutory language regarding patentable subject matter. Section 101 
provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent . . . .”114 
Compared to prior versions, the 1952 Patent Act replaced the term 
“art” with “process.”115 This change was not meant to be substantive 
because the term “art” had already “been interpreted by the courts 
as being practically synonymous with process or method.”116 The 
statute did, however, explicitly define “process” to include “a new 
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of 
matter, or material.”117 The purpose for including this definition was 
to abrogate case law that cast doubt on whether new uses of existing 
compounds or devices are patentable.118 By revising the definition 
of “process” to include new uses of existing processes or machines, 
Congress made clear that new uses of existing processes or 
machines would fall within the realm of patent-eligible subject 
matter.119 
Congress also liberalized the use of functional claims. In 
Halliburton, the Supreme Court held patents cannot claim the 
invention “in terms of what it will do.”120 Although this decision was 
largely consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedents,121 it drove 
Congress to craft legislation that would allow functional claiming 
while also addressing the Court’s concerns about the scope of such 
claims.122 Under the 1952 Patent Act, paragraph six of § 112 states: 
                                                 
 114 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 115 Id. at Reviser Notes. 
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 117 35 U.S.C § 100(b) (2012); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 
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An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means 
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of 
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be 
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts 
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.123 
As the statute makes clear, a claim may cover a function without 
reciting a structure, material or act to support it. The caveat, 
however, is “such claim shall be construed to cover the 
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the 
specification and equivalents thereof.”124 In other words, a patentee 
can use functional language, but the claim will be limited to 
whatever components or devices disclosed in the patent. 
Accordingly, an inventor who makes a propeller plane can still 
claim “a machine with a fuselage, wheels, and a means for flying.” 
Under § 112, the claim is not invalid even though “means for flying” 
is functional. Courts will, however, limit the claim’s scope to the 
propeller plane and its equivalents.125 That way, the inventor cannot 
assert her patent against future inventors who create different 
“means for flying.” 
III.  THE CHALLENGE OF SOFTWARE PATENTS 
As Congress crafted 1952 Patent Act, a technological revolution 
was already afoot.126 In 1946, scientists at the University of 
Pennsylvania designed the first general-purpose digital computer, 
called the ENIAC.127 The same year Congress passed the 1952 
Patent Act, scientists at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 
                                                 
 123 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2011) [hereinafter § 112(f)]. The America Invents Act 
reorganized Section 112, and paragraph six is now codified under subsection (f). 
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). The 
wording of this statutory subsection remains unchanged. 
 124 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2011). 
 125 See id. (explaining that a functional claim limitation shall be “construed to 
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification 
and equivalents thereof”). 
 126 David Bender, Computer Programs: Should They be Patentable, 68 COLUM. 
L. REV. 241, 243–44 (1968). 
 127 Frank da Cruz, Programming the ENIAC, COLUM. U. COMPUTING HIST. 
(Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/eniac.html. 
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created MANIAC I, a computer that could function on stored 
programs instead of hard-wired circuitry.128 
Software and general-purpose computers present difficult issues 
for patent eligibility. Unlike mechanical or chemical processes, 
software does not cause a physical transformation such as the 
creation of a new machine or chemical compound. Instead, 
computer programs manipulate data and signals. And, unlike 
traditional machines, most computer functions are untethered to 
their specific hardware configurations.129 General-purpose 
computers usually have a fairly standard set of components like a 
central processing unit and memory units, and most software 
programs will run on any standard hardware configuration.130 
When drafting the 1952 Act, Congress likely could not have 
predicted the impact of digital computers, or how difficult it would 
be to fit them under the existing patent jurisprudence. Accordingly, 
the law did not include any provisions to address software patents. 
But, not long after the 1952 Patent Act became law, software began 
to fundamentally change the paradigm for how machines function. 
Since then, courts have looked for a workable approach to assess the 
patentability of computer programs. This search has shaped the 
modern judicial approach to both patent eligibility and functional 
claiming. 
A. Patent Eligibility of Software Patents 
By the mid-1960s, computer technology was becoming 
ubiquitous, and policymakers started to recognize the difficult issues 
it created for patent law. In 1965, President Johnson established a 
commission to address emerging issues raised by “complex and 
rapidly changing technology” and make recommendations for 
reforming the patent system.131 The Commission proposed 
                                                 
 128 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 194 n.1 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 129 General Purpose Computer, INST. FOR TELECOMM. SCIS., 
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amending the Patent Act to categorically exclude software from 
patenting. Under the Committee’s proposal: 
A series of instructions which control or condition the operation of a data 
processing machine, generally referred to as a “program,” shall not be 
considered patentable regardless of whether the program is claimed as: 
(a) an article, (b) a process described in terms of the operations 
performed by a machine pursuant to a program, or (c) one or more 
machine configurations established by a program. 132 
The Commission noted “[u]ncertainty now exists as to whether 
the statute permits a valid patent to be granted on programs.”133 And 
it advocated against software patents in part because “the creation 
of programs has undergone substantial and satisfactory growth in 
the absence of patent protection and that copyright protection for 
programs is presently available.”134 The Commission’s 
recommended fix would not only preclude claiming programs in the 
abstract, but would also exclude claims on programmable devices 
built for specific tasks. 
Based on the Commission’s recommendations, Congress 
introduced the Patent Reform Act of 1967, which would have 
amended the 1952 Act by adding § 106, titled “Computer programs 
not patentable.”135 This proposed amendment stated “[a] plan of 
action or set of operating instructions, in whatever form presented, 
to cause a controllable data processor or computer to perform 
selected operations shall not be patentable.”136 Echoing the 
recommendation of the Commission’s Report, this statutory 
amendment would have eliminated patent protection for software 
entirely. 
                                                 
 132 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG., REP. ON THE 
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS. 20 (1966). 
 133 Id. at 21. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Bender, supra note 126, at 241–42; Donald W. Banner, The Recent Proposal 
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Not surprisingly, the nascent software industry vigorously 
opposed a categorical prohibition on patenting computer programs. 
Some argued it would be illogical to distinguish between traditional 
machines controlled by hardware and machines controlled by “a 
complex set of coded electrical impulses.”137 For example, the 
president of Applied Data Research, one of the largest software 
vendors at the time, testified that “a machine containing a 
programmed control system is the same in all features as that 
containing special purpose hardware controls.”138 The Chamber of 
Commerce argued “[f]urther study should be given to alternative 
solutions for determining what is and what is not patentable in the 
field of computer software, instead of immediately removing a vast 
new body of technology from patent consideration.”139 And the 
Commerce Department noted the difficulty of defining “computer 
program” and argued that a legislative exclusion for computer 
programs would be premature.140 Those opposing the amendment 
ultimately prevailed, and, despite holding extensive hearings on the 
proposed amendments, Congress did not pass the 1967 Patent 
Reform Act. 
Without a legislative solution, courts were left to grapple with 
computer programs on a case-by-case basis. In Gottschalk v. 
Benson, the Supreme Court held that a method of converting binary 
coded decimals to pure binary numerals was not patent-eligible.141 
Because the claims covered an algorithm in the abstract, the court 
observed “the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical 
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm 
itself.”142 The Court also stressed how “[t]he mathematical 
procedures can be carried out in existing computers long in use, no 
                                                 
 137 Patent Law Revision Hearings, supra note 135, at 751–53 (statement of 
Richard C. Jones, President of Applied Data Research Inc.). 
 138 See id. at 751. 
 139 Id. at 454 (statement of George F. Metcalf on behalf of the Chamber of 
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new machinery being necessary. And, as noted, they can also be 
performed without a computer.”143 
Intuitively, the Court’s holding that algorithms are abstract 
makes sense. After all, someone could use a pen and paper to 
perform decimal conversions or perhaps even make the calculations 
in their head. The more challenging question is whether specific 
computer implementations of software algorithms are patent-
eligible. For example, could someone patent a method of using a 
computer to run an algorithm that pools mutual funds into an 
investment portfolio?144 Because it runs on computer hardware, this 
patent might be less abstract than a method for converting binary 
signals to decimal. Arguably, however, the only “innovative” aspect 
of the claimed invention is the abstract idea of pooling mutual funds, 
not the computer that runs it. 
Until recently, the Supreme Court’s approach to specific 
implementations of software algorithms was unclear and 
inconsistent. In Parker v. Flook, the Court held that using an 
algorithm to automatically adjust variables in a chemical reaction 
was not patent-eligible.145 In doing so, the court rejected the notion 
that “if a process application implements a principle in some specific 
fashion, it automatically falls within the patentable subject matter of 
§ 101.”146 Yet the Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in 
Diamond v. Diehr, where the Court held that applying a 
mathematical equation to the process of curing rubber was patent-
eligible.147 Even though the physical steps in the claimed process 
were well-known, the Court characterized the claim as a “process 
for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a 
mathematical formula.”148 Flook and Diehr seemingly reached 
                                                 
 143 Id. at 67. 
 144 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 
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opposite conclusions about whether implementing an algorithm in a 
specific application is patent-eligible, and the tension between the 
two cases has been extensively examined in the legal literature.149 
Given this muddled Supreme Court guidance, lower courts took 
a fairly liberal approach to software patents. For its part, the Federal 
Circuit held an abstract method implemented on a generic computer 
is patent-eligible because it produces “a useful, concrete and 
tangible result.”150 Under this approach, the court found a computer-
implemented method for pooling mutual funds was patentable 
because it transforms “data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by 
a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final 
share price.”151 The Federal Circuit’s approach helped fuel a sharp 
rise in software patenting that started in the 1990s and continued into 
the 2000s.152 By 2011, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) estimated over half of all issued patents were related to 
software.153 The same GAO study also found software patents 
accounted for more than half of all patent lawsuit filings.154 
B. Functional Claiming in Software Patents 
At the same time, the judicial approach to functional claiming 
under § 112 also promoted the growth of software patents. Section 
112(f) applies to claims that express an element “as a means or step 
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, 
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material, or acts in support thereof.”155 Until recently, the Federal 
Circuit took this language quite literally. That is, § 112(f) 
presumably did not apply unless the patent recited the terms “means 
for” or “step for.”156 As the court explained, “[w]hen the claim 
drafter has not signaled his intent to invoke § 112 [(f)], by using the 
term ‘means,’ we are unwilling to apply that provision without a 
showing that the limitation essentially is devoid of anything that can 
be construed as structure.”157 
At first glance, software patents may not seem functional 
because they recite hardware components and software constructs. 
These limitations, however, often fail to constrain software patents 
beyond the claimed functions. A typical software patent might claim 
“a computer readable medium for performing a set of functions.”158 
The problem is “computer readable medium” does not impose any 
meaningful constraint on claim scope.159 Software runs on 
computers, so it is always stored on a computer readable medium. 
Likewise, software patents often recite limitations that look 
structural but are actually purely functional. For example, the patent 
in Finjan v. Secure Computing Corporation covered a “system 
comprising . . . an interface . . . , a comparator . . . , and a logical 
engine.”160 Terms like “interface” and “comparator” have no 
structural aspect whatsoever and are software constructs that are 
defined entirely by their function.161 
Although claims like “server comprising an interface and a 
logical engine” might cover function, they do not recite “means for” 
or “step for.” Without these talismanic words, courts often refused 
to find the claims invoked § 112(f).162 As a result, software patents 
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would often claim broad functions while avoiding the narrowing 
effect of § 112(f).163 One study found every software patent asserted 
by non-practicing entities used some variety of functional language, 
and half of all software patents litigated by other companies used 
functional claiming as well.164 Functional claiming also allows 
patentees to assert software patents against later developed 
technology. As a result, some have argued “software patents 
circumvent[] the limits the 1952 Act places on functional 
claiming.”165 
In 2015, partly in response to the proliferation of functional 
claiming in software, the Federal Circuit abandoned the “[strong] 
presumption that a limitation lacking the word ‘means’ is not subject 
to § 112 [(f)].”166 In Williamson v. Citrix Online,167 the court 
observed its presumption “is unwarranted, is uncertain in meaning 
and application, and has the inappropriate practical effect of placing 
a thumb on what should otherwise be a balanced analytical scale.”168 
Instead, the court announced the standard for applying § 112 should 
be “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of 
ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the 
name for structure.”169 
After Williamson, courts seem more willing to find that software 
patents invoke means plus function under § 112. For instance, the 
Federal Circuit held “compliance mechanism” and “symbol 
generator” were both means-plus-function limitations, even though 
the claims never used the term “means.”170 Williamson, however, did 
not eliminate functional software claims altogether.171 District courts 
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have held that terms like “content processor for processing content” 
and “circuitry . . . for receiving the information” are not functional 
claims under § 112(f), even though the hardware in the claim 
imposes no meaningful limits on claim scope.172 
Regardless, any change wrought by Williamson has been 
eclipsed by the Supreme Court’s Alice v. CLS Bank decision.173 The 
court in Alice ruled a generic computer implementation of a business 
method was a patent-ineligible abstract concept.174 After Alice, 
courts will often invalidate functional software claims altogether 
before reaching the § 112(f) inquiry. In some ways, the expansion 
of the abstract idea exception under Alice has now subsumed the 
functional claiming inquiry. 
IV.  LIMITING SOFTWARE PATENTS UNDER SECTION 101 
By the start of the twenty-first century policymakers were 
expressing greater skepticism about software patents.175 Those 
opposed to software patents argued such patents disclosed nothing 
innovative, had unclear scope, and hampered innovation.176 Critics 
also focused on businesses that licensed and litigated patents as their 
exclusive source of revenue.177 In 2011, these so called non-
practicing entities, or “patent trolls,” sued over 5,000 firms at an 
estimated cost of over $29 billion.178 
In response, Congress and courts tried to address these perceived 
abuses of the patent system. In 2011, Congress passed the America 
Invents Act (AIA), which created several administrative procedures 
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that made it easier to challenge patents at the PTO.179 Around the 
same time, both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court took an 
increasingly narrow view of patentable subject matter, particularly 
as it relates to software.180 Of these decisions, the most important for 
software patents is Alice, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a 
method of mitigating financial risk on a computer.181 In doing so, the 
court adopted a two-step framework for patent eligibility.182 The first 
step asks whether the patent is directed to an abstract idea or other 
judicial exception to patentable subject matter.183 If it does, then the 
court moves on to step two, where it determines whether the claim 
recites an “inventive concept.”184 
Shortly before the Supreme Court decided Alice, Professor Mark 
Lemley cautioned “the current trend is one that would invalidate a 
wide swath of software patent claims, particularly functional claims 
. . . [,] not because they are too broad, or indefinite, but because they 
are not the sort of thing that is patentable at all.”185 Four years after 
Alice, this warning seems prescient. Under Alice step one, courts 
frequently hold software functions are unpatentable abstract ideas.186 
The Federal Circuit even stated it was a “foundational patent law 
principle[] that a result, even an innovative result, is not itself 
patentable.”187 So in many cases, functional software claims are no 
longer narrowed under § 112(f), but are instead invalidated under 
§ 101. 
There is an ongoing debate about whether this approach to 
software patents helps or hinders innovation. However, the growing 
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consensus is the two-step process for evaluating patent eligibility 
fails to provide sufficient clarity for lower courts, the PTO, and 
practitioners.188 This section does not attempt to resolve the decades-
long debate about software patents, nor does it advocate for a new 
interpretation of § 101. It will, however, clarify the court’s approach 
to functional software claims, which is critical to understanding the 
rationale underlying post-Alice judicial decisions. In particular, this 
section explains how courts cannot agree on whether software 
functions are inherently abstract. Some decisions hold if software 
claims use purely functional language, then they fail § 101 
regardless of what the specification discloses.189 By contrast, other 
opinions do not automatically condemn functional software 
claims.190 Instead, they look to the patent specification to determine 
if the claimed software functions rely on a patent-eligible 
technological solution.191 
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A. The Alice/Mayo Two-Step Framework 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Alice is commonly understood 
as a turning point for software patentability. While that may be true, 
Alice also represents the culmination of decades-long concerns 
regarding the proliferation of software patents, which were 
increasingly viewed as hampering innovation and exacting a toll on 
business. For its part, Congress passed the America Invents Act 
(“AIA”) in 2011, which created new administrative procedures to 
make challenging overbroad patents easier.192 
The AIA, however, did not change any substantive requirements 
for patentability.193 Even without a legislative amendment to § 101, 
the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that tightened patent 
eligibility standards.194 In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court 
rejected the notion that a claimed process was patent-eligible so long 
as it was “tied to a particular machine or apparatus” or “transforms 
a particular article into a different state or thing.”195 The Court noted 
that while this “may well provide a sufficient basis for evaluating 
processes similar to those in the Industrial Age . . . , there are reasons 
to doubt whether the test should be the sole criterion for determining 
the patentability of inventions in the Information Age.”196 
The trend towards stricter patent eligibility standards continued 
in Mayo v. Prometheus, where the Supreme Court invalidated 
claims directed to a method for determining the proper dosage of a 
drug by measuring a specific biomarker.197 Mayo is also the first case 
where the Court expressly adopted a two-step framework for 
determining patent eligibility. At step one, courts ask whether the 
claim as a whole is directed to a patent-ineligible concept.198 If the 
claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept, then the court 
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proceeds to step two, where it searches for “an ‘inventive concept,’ 
sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”199 
Because Mayo involved a method of detecting a biomarker and 
adjusting drug dosage, its impact on computer and software patents 
was not immediately clear. In Alice, however, the Supreme Court 
confirmed Mayo’s two step approach applied to computer and 
software patents as well.200 There, the Court held that implementing 
a method of mitigating financial risk on a generic computer is not 
patent-eligible.201 Applying the two-step inquiry first announced in 
Mayo, the Court found the claimed financial method was an abstract 
idea at step one.202 “[T]he claims . . . are drawn to the concept of 
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate 
settlement risk,” observed the Court.203 And “the concept of 
intermediated settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long 
prevalent in our system of commerce.’”204 
At step two, the court held that applying an abstract idea on a 
computer was not sufficient to make that idea patent-eligible.205 
While recognizing that claims directed to a machine or computer-
readable medium are “formally addressed to patent-eligible subject 
matter,” the Court nevertheless held that “the mere recitation of a 
generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea 
into a patent-eligible invention.”206 “Stating an abstract idea while 
adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’ simply combines those 
two steps, with the same deficient result.”207 
Notably, the analysis in Alice echoes earlier decisions on 
functional claiming. For instance, although the claims recited 
hardware such as “data processing system” and “communications 
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controller,” the Court noted these components are “purely functional 
and generic.” 208 The Court explained: 
Nearly every computer will include a “communications controller” and 
“data storage unit” capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, 
and transmission functions required by the method claims. As a result, 
none of the hardware recited by the system claims “offers a meaningful 
limitation beyond generally linking ‘the use of the [method] to a 
particular technological environment,’ that is, implementation via 
computers.”209 
After Alice, lower courts have generally held that claims reciting 
an abstract idea or algorithm implemented on a generic computer 
are ineligible for patenting.210 One of the first post-Alice decisions 
from the Federal Circuit was buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., in which 
the court invalidated a software patent directed to a “machine-
readable media encoded to perform steps for guaranteeing a party’s 
performance of its online transaction.”211 The court found “[t]he 
claims’ invocation of computers adds no inventive concept” and 
“[t]he computer functionality is generic.”212 And the court 
emphasized that narrowing the claim to use in a computer is at best 
an “‘attempt[] to limit the use of the abstract guarantee idea ‘to a 
particular technological environment,’ which has long been held 
insufficient to save a claim in this context.”213 
Some decisions go beyond finding that abstract ideas 
implemented on generic computers are ineligible, and they will even 
invalidate claims that recite specific devices or components under 
§ 101.214 For example, the patent in In re TLI related “a method and 
system for taking, transmitting, and organizing digital images.”215 
Although some claims required “tangible components such as ‘a 
telephone unit’ and a ‘server,’” the Federal Circuit determined “the 
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recited physical components merely provide a generic environment 
in which to carry out the abstract idea of classifying and storing 
digital images in an organized manner.”216 
B. Software Patents After Alice 
The overall impact of Alice on computer and software patents is 
significant. One study found the Federal Circuit invalidated patents 
in 90% of patent eligibility cases involving information 
technology.217 For PTO reviews of covered business patents, which 
often involve software implementation of business methods, over 
95% of all § 101 decisions resulted in patent invalidity.218 In a 
concurring opinion, Judge Mayer urged his colleagues on the 
Federal Circuit “to acknowledge that Alice sounded the death knell 
for software patents.”219 He argued software “is inherently abstract 
because it is merely ‘an idea without physical embodiment[.]’ Given 
that an ‘idea’ is not patentable, and a generic computer is ‘beside the 
point’ in the eligibility analysis, all software implemented on a 
standard computer should be deemed categorically outside the 
bounds of § 101.”220 
Does Judge Mayer accurately claim that post-Alice, all software 
is ineligible under § 101? At least for now, the Federal Circuit has 
carved out a space for software patents that claim improvements in 
computer functionality. That is, the court distinguishes between 
improvements in computer technology itself, which remain 
patentable, and new functions of a conventional computer, which 
are ineligible.221 
                                                 
 216 Id. at 611. 
 217 Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 39, at 767. 
 218 #Alicestorm: April Update and the Impact of TC Heartland on Patent 
Eligibility, BILSKI BLOG, (June 1, 2017), https://www.bilskiblog.com/2017/06/ 
alicestorm-april-update-and-the-impact-of-tc-heartland/#more-3237. 
 219 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1325 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The 
Supreme Court has suggested that claims ‘purport[ing] to improve the functioning 
of the computer itself,’ or ‘improv[ing] an existing technological process’ might 
not succumb to the abstract idea exception.”); see also Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat 
260 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 227 
To illustrate, consider the patent in Enfish v. Microsoft, which 
claimed a new logical model for a computer database.222 The Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to invalidate the patent 
under § 101.223 In doing so, the court stressed Alice did not “broadly 
hold that all improvements in computer-related technology are 
inherently abstract,” and “some improvements in computer-related 
technology when appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not 
abstract, such as a chip architecture, an LED display, and the like.”224 
The Court further noted “[s]oftware can make non-abstract 
improvements to computer technology just as hardware 
improvements can.”225 Thus, the relevant question is “whether the 
claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality 
versus being directed to an abstract idea.”226 Turning to the patent at 
issue, the court held the claims were “specifically directed to a self-
referential table for a computer database” that offered “increased 
flexibility, faster search times, and smaller memory requirements” 
over conventional computer databases.227 
Nevertheless, it can be difficult to distinguish between 
“improvements in computer technology” and “new functions of 
generic computers.” Under the Federal Circuit’s standard, if a 
programmer writes an algorithm that makes a smartphone run faster 
or use less memory, then she has improved the computer’s 
functionality.228 By contrast, if the programmer develops an 
application that allows a smartphone to perform new tasks, she is 
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likely implementing an abstract idea on generic components.229 
Arguably, however, a smartphone that functions as a payment 
device and a navigation tool is also an “improvement” over a device 
that only browses the Internet, even if the underlying hardware 
remains unchanged. Consider two cases: 
1. Many commuters might prefer to pay their subway fare with 
a bank or credit card. The problem, however, is verifying bankcard 
transactions takes time, which inevitably creates delays in busy 
subway terminals.230 In Smart Systems, the patentee solved this 
problem by storing a list of preapproved bank cards at each 
terminal.231 That way, individual terminals can quickly determine 
whether a bank card is associated with a preapproved transit account 
by referencing the locally stored list.232 
2. Network service providers need to monitor and account for 
the online activity of devices on their network.233 But receiving and 
processing every device’s network activity at a central server 
requires a lot of computational power and memory.234 In Amdocs, 
the patentee claimed a system that records the activity of each 
networked device at or near the device’s location.235 This “reduces 
the storage and computational resource requirements” for the central 
server.236 
The Federal Circuit reached different results in these two cases. 
In Smart Systems, the court invalidated a patent for verifying 
payments at a subway terminal.237 In doing so, the court 
characterized the invention as “directed to the collection, storage, 
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and recognition of data.”238 Accordingly, the focus of the claims was 
not “‘on the specific asserted improvement in computer 
capabilities.’”239 Instead, the “computers are invoked merely as a 
tool” to carry out the claimed function.240 In Amdocs, however, the 
court upheld a patent on a system of tracking network activity.241 
There, the court reasoned the claim aimed to solve the technological 
problem of “massive record flows” by applying the technological 
solution of “enhancing data in a distributed fashion.”242 
Are Amdocs and Smart Systems consistent with one another? 
Arguably, the patent in Smart Systems describes improvements in 
computer functionality. By storing a preapproved list of bank cards, 
the patent avoids network latency by verifying bank and credit card 
payments at transit terminals.243 The court, however, characterized 
the claim as “the collection of financial data from third parties, the 
storing of that financial data, linking proffered credit cards to the 
financial data, and allowing access to a transit system based on the 
financial data.”244 But, as the dissent points out, this characterization 
arguably misses the “heart of the invention,” which is overcoming 
the network latency that hinders the “use of conventional bankcards 
to access mass transit.”245 
Perhaps we can distinguish Amdocs from Smart Systems because 
monitoring network traffic seems more “technical” than storing a 
list of preapproved bank and credit cards. A human being can check 
bank-card numbers against a preapproved list at a subway terminal, 
however tedious or impracticable the task may be. However, no 
human can monitor network traffic without a computer. The 
problem with this reasoning is Amdocs did not involve a patent that 
actually claimed a technical solution for monitoring network 
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traffic.246 One exemplary claim, for example, recites “a computer 
program product embodied on a computer readable storage medium 
for processing network accounting information” through distributed 
network architecture.247 As the dissent observed, nothing in the claim 
recites how distributed network architecture would process network 
account information.248 
Other than figuring out whether a patent is directed to an abstract 
concept at Alice step one, there are also practical challenges for 
determining whether software patents recite an inventive concept at 
step two. As a general matter, patent eligibility is a question of 
law.249 It is also a threshold issue in many cases.250 Accordingly, 
courts often decide patent eligibility at the pleadings stage before 
hearing any expert testimony or resolving claim construction.251 
Treating patent eligibility as a pure legal question, however, creates 
problems at Alice step two, where the court searches for an 
“inventive concept” in the claim.252 The Supreme Court has stressed 
that an inventive concept must go beyond what is “well-understood, 
routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in by those in the 
field.”253 But how does a court determine what is well-understood, 
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routine and conventional? That inquiry necessarily depends on the 
state of the technology at the time of invention and requires courts 
to make factual determinations about the type of activity “engaged 
in by those in the field.”254 
Recognizing this problem, the Federal Circuit recently held 
Alice step two can include subsidiary factual issues.255 In Berkheimer 
v. HP Inc., the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment of invalidity under § 101.256 The patent was directed to a 
process of storing digital files “without substantial redundancy.”257 
The court held “[w]hether something is well-understood, routine, 
and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a 
factual determination.”258 And because the patent contends the 
claimed function “improves system operating efficiency and 
reduces storage costs,” the court found “there is at least a genuine 
issue of material fact” as to whether the patents are directed to an 
improvement in computer functionality.259 Similarly, in Aatrix 
Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., the court vacated the 
district court’s finding of invalidity because the amended complaint 
alleged a claimed “data file” improved the operability of the 
software.260 Based on the amended complaint, the court held it was 
not proper to dismiss the claim on the pleadings.261 
Treating patent eligibility as a factual issue, however, creates 
complications as well. Once courts delve into what technology was 
“well-understood” at the time of invention, the analysis starts to look 
like an obviousness determination under § 103. And resolving 
whether a claim is obvious usually requires a fact-intensive inquiry 
into the differences between the claimed invention and the prior 
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art.262 Indeed, if courts were required to conduct an obviousness-type 
analysis under § 101, then it would seem incongruent to also treat 
patent eligibility as a threshold issue capable of resolution on the 
pleadings. 
Judge Lourie recently identified some of the problems inherent 
in Alice step two and even questioned whether there should “be a 
step two in an abstract idea analysis at all.”263 In a concurring opinion 
to the denial of en banc rehearing in Berkheimer, Judge Lourie 
observed the prohibition on “computer functions [that] are ‘well-
understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to 
the industry . . . is essentially a §§ 102 and 103 inquiry.”264 He 
further noted that, regardless of whether step two is treated as a 
question of fact or law, the decision will ultimately “not work us out 
of the current Section 101 dilemma,” and the inquiry “digs the hole 
deeper by further complicating the Section 101 analysis.”265 
As Judge Lourie’s opinion points out, the § 101 inquiry has 
become complex and unwieldy. The issue can be especially hard to 
resolve for the PTO, where patent examiners must decide whether a 
claimed invention was “routine and conventional” without access to 
discovery or expert testimony. To help guide this endeavor, the 
Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy issued a 
memo in 2018 that instructed examiners to rely on four sources to 
determine whether an idea is routine.266 They are: (1) the express 
statement of the patent applicant; (2) court decisions; (3) a 
publication like a book or manual; or (4) official notice based on 
personal knowledge.267 The last source, official notice, should only 
                                                 
 262 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); John M. 
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be used where the examiner is certain the claimed method is “widely 
prevalent or in common use.”268 Practically speaking, however, 
figuring out if something is “widely prevalent or in common use” 
sounds like another way of asking whether the idea would have been 
especially obvious to those in the field. 
C. Addressing Functional Software Claims through Section 101 
Despite Judge Mayer’s insistence that Alice sounded the death 
knell for software patents, at least some software patents remain 
valid.269 But, as the previous section explains, figuring out which 
software patents are eligible requires wading into a morass of 
seemingly conflicting judicial decisions. And from a practical 
perspective, the Alice two-step test is hard to administer because it 
can encompass factual inquiries even though it is ostensibly a 
threshold issue. 
This section looks at the Alice inquiry for software patents at a 
different angle. Instead of resolving whether claims recite 
“improvements on computer technology” or implement an abstract 
idea on generic computers, it focuses on how judicial concerns about 
functional software claims influence post-Alice decisions under 
§ 101. Although viewing the issue from this perspective does not 
resolve every conceptual difficulty regarding software patents, it 
should at least clarify the current judicial approach to patent 
eligibility for software. 
To start, there is general consensus that functional claim 
language is at least relevant to the § 101 inquiry post-Alice. In 
Electric Power Group, the Federal Circuit observed that “essentially 
result-focused, functional character of claim language has been a 
frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101, especially in 
the area of using generic computer and network technology to carry 
out economic transactions.”270 Similarly, the court in Finjan v. Blue 
                                                 
 268 Id. at 3. 
 269 See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (“Nor do we think that claims directed to software, as opposed to hardware, 
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Coat Systems announced that a result “is not itself patentable.”271 
Even in Amdocs, which upheld the validity of the challenged 
patents, the majority acknowledged that functional claiming could 
be “a helpful way of double-checking” whether an invention is 
directed to an abstract idea or “an inventive concept in 
application.”272 
But beyond recognizing its relevance, courts cannot agree on a 
specific approach to functional software claims under § 101. Some 
decisions treat software functions as inherently abstract.273 
Accordingly, if the claims use purely functional language, then the 
patent likely fails § 101 regardless of what the specification 
discloses.274 This approach “would save the patent’s eligibility under 
§ 101 only if the claim at issue itself explicitly states the necessary 
‘means’” to perform the claimed function.275 By contrast, other 
decisions do not foreclose functional claiming altogether under 
§ 101. Instead, they look to the patent specification to determine if 
the claimed function relies on a patent-eligible technological 
solution.276 Under this latter approach, purely functional software 
claims can still survive § 101 scrutiny so long as the specification 
discloses technological improvements to perform the claimed 
function—even if those improvements are not expressly claimed. 
To illustrate this distinction, I return to my hypothetical example 
of an inventor who creates a propeller plane, but broadly claims “a 
                                                 
 271 Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 272 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed. 
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machine that applies Bernoulli’s principle to fly.” Under the first 
approach, we would treat the function of “applying Bernoulli’s 
principle to fly” as an abstract idea. As a result, the claim is 
ineligible because it recites an abstract function, but is silent on how 
the invention applies Bernoulli’s principle, what components are 
used, or how those components are assembled. By contrast, the 
second approach looks beyond the claims to the specification, which 
discloses a design for a propeller plane. Thus, the patent provides a 
non-abstract, mechanical device that applies Bernoulli’s principle to 
fly. As a result, the claim is not abstract under the second approach 
because it captures the inventor’s specific technological 
improvement.277 
For its part, the Federal Circuit has yet to settle on one approach 
over the other. For example, Apple v. Ameranth reflects the first 
approach, in which software functions are considered inherently 
abstract.278 There, the court invalidated a patent that disclosed a 
system for generating and transmitting menus that could be used in 
restaurants.279 In doing so, the court observed “[t]he patents claim 
systems including menus with particular features. They do not claim 
a particular way of programming or designing the software to create 
menus that have these features, but instead merely claim the 
resulting systems. Essentially, the claims are directed to certain 
functionality . . . .”280 Further, the court dismissed the specification’s 
disclosure of programming details—the means for accomplishing 
the claimed function—as “immaterial because these details are not 
recited in the actual claims.”281 Similarly, in Affinity Labs v. Amazon, 
the Court invalidated claims that “describe a desired function or 
outcome, without providing any limiting detail that confines the 
claim to a particular solution to an identified problem. The purely 
                                                 
 277 See, e.g., Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1303 (“The collection, filtering, aggregating, 
and completing steps all depend upon the invention’s unique distributed 
architecture—the same architecture outlined in our earlier analysis of the ‘065 
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functional nature of the claim confirms that it is directed to an 
abstract idea, not to a concrete embodiment of that idea.”282 
By contrast, other Federal Circuit decisions look beyond the 
claim language to determine whether the patent is directed to a non-
abstract technological improvement.283 For example, in Visual 
Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., the court upheld claims directed to 
a computer memory system with “programmable operational 
characteristics that can be tailored for use with multiple different 
processors . . . .”284 The claims, however, said nothing about the 
“programmable operational characteristic,” other than stating that it 
“determines a type of data stored by said cache.”285 Even though the 
claim described the computer memory system by its function, the 
court nevertheless found it patent-eligible in part because the patent 
disclosed code to perform the claimed function.286 
Similarly, the court in Amdocs upheld the challenged patent 
because the claimed functions “all depend upon the invention’s 
unconventional distributed architecture,” which can only be 
understood “through an examination of the claims in light of the 
written description.”287 There, the claims recited functions like 
“collecting network communications usage information” and 
“storing the plurality of data records in a database.”288 But instead of 
focusing only on the functional nature of the claims, the court looked 
beyond the claim language and relied on portions of the 
specification that disclosed a “distributed architecture” to perform 
these functions.289 Amdocs also expressly rejected the notion that a 
function, or a “desired goal,” is always an abstract idea.290 The court 
refused to “focus[] on the difference between ‘means’ and ‘ends,’” 
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and argued that such an approach would conflate means-plus-
function practice under § 112(f) with the § 101 analysis.291 “That is 
not now the law, either in statute or in court decision,” contended 
the majority in Amdocs.292 
The same dispute about functional software claiming is also 
manifest at Alice step two, where the court must search for an 
inventive concept.293 At step two, the issue is whether reciting a 
software function is sufficient to transform an otherwise abstract 
concept into a patentable application.294 In Berkheimer, the claim 
recited “[a] method of archiving an item in a computer processing 
system” wherein object structures are stored “in the archive without 
substantial redundancy.”295 At the pleading stage, the Federal Circuit 
held there was a factual dispute as to whether “storing a reconciled 
object structure in the archive without substantial redundancy” 
represents an inventive concept.296 In doing so, the court cited the 
specification’s disclosure of a system that reduces redundancy by 
analyzing the variations between archived objects and linking 
common text and graphical elements.297 Because the claims recite 
the function of storing objects “without substantial redundancy,” the 
court found the claim language “capture[d] these improvements” 
described in the specification.298 
This approach to Alice step two drew a sharp dissent from Judge 
Reyna in the denial of petition for en banc rehearing in 
Berkheimer.299 In his dissent, Judge Reyna stressed that the search 
for an “inventive concept . . . is predominately a legal question 
focused on the claims.”300 That is, “the claim ha[s] to supply a ‘new 
and useful’ application of the idea in order to be patent eligible.”301 
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Although not stated explicitly, the dissent implies that a claim 
cannot “capture” a specific technological improvement just by 
stating its function.302 Instead, the claim would likely need to recite 
the actual means for performing the claimed function. 
Regardless of whether the issue is framed as an inquiry under 
step one or two, the basic disagreement centers on whether claims 
directed to software functions are inherently abstract, or if they can 
pass § 101 based on technological improvements described in the 
specification. On one hand, it makes sense that courts should look 
to the specification to determine what the invention covers. After 
all, terms like “programmable operational characteristic” are largely 
meaningless unless they are placed in context. Likewise, where the 
patent describes detailed algorithms for achieving an improvement 
in computer technology, it seems reasonable to rely on that 
description to determine whether the claim is abstract. 
The problem, however, is that even if the specification provides 
detailed or groundbreaking algorithms to improve computer 
technology, the claims ultimately cover broad functions like 
“determin[ing] a type of data stored by said cache” and “storing a 
reconciled object structure in the archive without substantial 
redundancy.”303 These functions could be performed by any number 
of algorithms, and there is no guarantee the claim would be limited 
to what is disclosed in the specification.304 To the contrary, claim 
terms with broad plain meanings are generally not limited to the 
disclosed embodiments.305 As a result, the claims can still be asserted 
against totally different algorithms that perform the same functions. 
Because of this dilemma, some practitioners have urged 
Congress to adopt a compromise solution based on § 112(f).306 
Under this proposal, courts would rely on the specification to 
determine whether a claimed software function is patent-eligible, 
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while also limiting the scope of functional software claims to the 
disclosed embodiments.307 Although this idea makes sense in theory, 
there are practical hurdles to implementing this type of solution for 
software patents, particularly for Article III courts. The next section 
discusses this proposal as well as other legislative amendments 
aimed at providing more clarity to the § 101 analysis. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORMS 
With broad dissatisfaction at the current state of the law on 
patent eligibility, attention has once again turned to Congress for a 
legislative fix. Proponents of legislative reform argue that legislative 
action is required to overturn the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Mayo and Alice, which they believe to be recent distortions in patent 
law.308 One patent bar association, for example, contend that 
legislative action is needed to “return the law to what the 1952 
Patent Act meant to provide.”309 
In reality, redrafting the statutory definition of patent-eligible 
subject matter is an unprecedented step that would likely go beyond 
abrogating Mayo and Alice. The statutory language of § 101 has 
remained largely unchanged since the Patent Act of 1793, which 
established the categories of patentable subject matter.310 Those 
categories were in turn derived from contemporaneous English 
standards for patent eligibility.311 In short, the statutory definition of 
patentable subject matter has always been broadly drawn, and the 
standard has developed largely through common law.312 If any of the 
leading proposals are enacted, it would be the first time that 
Congress intervened to dramatically broaden patentable subject 
matter. 
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That is not to say Congress should reject a legislative fix just 
because the statutory language has not been changed before. 
Proponents of reform correctly note that Alice’s two-step standard 
is nebulous and difficult to apply.313 And it may also seem absurd 
that courts should rely on statutory language crafted in the early 
Industrial era to evaluate patents covering smart-phones and self-
driving cars. Nevertheless, Congress must approach legislative 
reform with a clear understanding of why courts are invalidating so 
many software patents under the current statutory definition of 
patentable subject matter. As the previous section describes, a key 
question is whether software functions are inherently abstract. 
This section will review the current leading proposed legislative 
amendments to § 101 and explain why they fail to address the 
underlying issue of functional software claims. It will also consider 
whether courts can narrowly construe functional software claims to 
cover only the specific algorithms or programming described in the 
specification, which is similar to the current approach under 
§ 112(f). This section argues that although such a proposal might 
work in theory, it presents practical difficulties for courts because it 
requires guidelines on what types of algorithms and programs are 
definite enough to support the claimed functions. 
A. Proposed Legislative Amendments 
Proposals to amend § 101 have emerged from various bar and 
patent owner groups, including the American Bar Association 
(ABA) Section of IP law, the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association (AIPLA), and the Intellectual Property Owners 
Association (IPO).314 Although the details might differ, the proposed 
                                                 
 313 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, Joint AIPLA–IPO Proposal on Patent 
Eligibility, at 2, https://www.aipla.org/docs/default-
source/uploadedfiles/documents/resources2/reports/2017aipladirect/documents/a
ipla-report-on-101-reform-5-19-17-errata.pdf?sfvrsn=138c9ce7_1 (last accessed 
Aug. 3, 2018) [hereinafter JOINT AIPLA–IPO PROPOSAL] (“The Federal Circuit, 
the district courts, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are all struggling to 
find a principled formula to guide their decision-making . . . .”). 
 314 Id.; Letter from Donna P. Suchy, Section Chair, American Bar Association 
Section of Intellectual Property Law, to the Hon. Michelle K. Lee, Director of the 
USPTO (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba 
274 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 227 
amendments all aim to abrogate the two-step test established by 
Mayo and Alice. Likewise, most proposals attempt to carve out 
functional claiming considerations from the patent eligibility 
analysis. 
In June 2018, Congress introduced the Restoring America’s 
Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018, which incorporates the 
AIPLA-IPO joint proposal nearly verbatim.315 AIPLA-IPO’s joint 
proposal would add two sub-sections to § 101.316 Section 101(b) 
specifies that an invention is ineligible “only if the claimed 
invention as a whole exists in nature independent of and prior to any 
human activity, or can be performed solely in the human mind.”317 
Under the proposed amendment, any “result of human actions as 
applied to nature” would be patent-eligible.318 
Proposed § 101(c) states that eligibility “shall be determined 
without regard to without regard to the requirements or conditions 
of sections 102, 103, and 112 of this title, the manner in which the 
claimed invention was made or discovered, or whether the claimed 
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invention includes an inventive concept.”319 Instead of relying on 
§ 101 to invalidate patents, § 101(c) would “return the inquiry to 
well-developed legal principles” for patentability developed under 
other sections of the patent statute.320 The goal is to “stop decision 
makers from confusing the patent eligibility inquiry with the 
enablement, written description, and definiteness inquiries under 
Section 112.”321 The AIPLA criticized the Supreme Court for 
“confus[ing] its own early cases, which repeatedly compare the 
scope of claims to the scope of patent disclosures to determine 
whether claims are in fact too broad, an inquiry required by the 
enablement and written description requirements.”322 
The AIPLA-IPO proposal represents a fairly radical change to 
patentable subject matter. Not only would it abrogate Mayo and 
Alice, but it also undercuts the reasoning in seminal nineteenth 
century cases like Morse. Because the amendment limits abstract 
ideas to activities “performed solely in the human mind,” any 
computer implementation of an abstract idea, no matter how routine, 
would likely be patentable. After all, a hard-drive containing a 
program for hedging risk does not “exist in nature,” nor can it be 
“performed solely in the human mind.” Likewise, Samuel Morse’s 
claim for using electric current to generate characters or signs at a 
remote location would also be patent-eligible, since this process 
cannot be performed solely in the human mind either.323 
Although the AIPLA-IPO proposal is likely easier to apply than 
the current Alice two-step test, it does not resolve the underlying 
concern that software patents can be used to circumvent the judicial 
prohibition on patenting abstract ideas. In the modern world, few 
business processes or financial transactions are performed without 
computers. Accordingly, taking an abstract idea like intermediated 
settlement and reciting “apply it on the computer” does not impose 
any meaningful limitations to the abstract idea itself.324 Simply 
stated, a patent that covers “intermediated settlement on a computer” 
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has essentially the same scope as a patent on “intermediated 
settlement” generally. And contrary to the AIPLA-IPO’s 
suggestion, it is far from clear that other patentability requirements 
could address this problem. After all, a claim on a revolutionary new 
type of intermediated settlement may be well-defined and readily 
implemented on a computer. Thus, the claim may very well satisfy 
the requirements of §§ 112, 102 and 103. Yet such a claim might 
still preempt a basic business practice. 
Compared to the AIPLA-IPO joint proposal, the ABA’s 
proposal to amend § 101 is more modest.325 The ABA’s proposal 
would add another subsection to § 101 under which a patent 
application may be “denied eligibility under this section 101 on the 
ground that the scope of the exclusive rights under such a claim 
would preempt the use by others of all practical applications of a 
law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea.”326 In a letter to 
the PTO Director, the ABA noted “the consistency with which the 
Court states that its fundamental concern is the potential ‘pre-
emption’ of the use of building blocks like laws of nature, natural 
phenomenon and abstract ideas . . . . At its core, preemption is the 
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 326 Id. at 3. Under the ABA’s proposed amendment, § 101 would read: 
a)  Eligible Subject Matter – Whoever invents or discovers any useful 
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101 shall not be negated based on considerations of patentability as 
defined in Sections 102, 103 and 112, including whether the claims in 
whole or in part define an inventive concept. 
Id. at 3–4. 
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driving force behind the Court’s jurisprudence.”327 Unlike the 
AIPLA-IPO joint proposal, the ABA proposal would preserve the 
courts’ ability to invalidate patents that are directed to a computer, 
but nevertheless preempt an abstract idea. 
The ABA proposal, however, attempts to limit judicial authority 
over patentable subject matter in other respects. The proposed 
amendment requires courts and the PTO to “fully consider[] . . . 
each and every limitation of the claims.”328 And it prohibits courts 
from negating patent eligibility based on “consideration of those 
claims” as a whole.329 This section seems to address the Alice two-
step test, which requires the court to resolve what the claim is 
“directed to” as a whole.330 Nevertheless, the amendment is unclear 
because it does not specify what patentable weight courts must 
assign to each limitation. Even under the current two-step standard, 
it would be unusual, and likely improper, for a court to ignore claim 
limitations entirely. For example, the patent in Alice implemented a 
method of intermediated settlement on a computer.331 The Supreme 
Court held the claim was “directed to . . . a method of exchanging 
financial obligations . . . .”332 In doing so, the Court still considered 
the computer implementation step, but found that it was not “enough 
for patent eligibility.”333 Accordingly, it is not immediately clear 
how the ABA proposal would actually alter the Alice step two 
inquiry. 
Like the AIPLA-IPO proposal, the ABA’s proposed amendment 
also tries to separate § 101 from other patentability requirements. 
The ABA’s proposal states that “[e]ligibility under this section 101 
shall not be negated based on considerations of patentability as 
defined in Sections 102, 103 and 112, including whether the claims 
in whole or in part define an inventive concept.”334 According to the 
ABA, “[t]he proposal at least substantially mitigates if not resolves 
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newly injected ambiguity and confusion into the eligibility 
determination caused by the use of factors that are relevant only to 
novelty, obviousness, and the requirements of particularity in 
claiming an invention.”335 
This represents a flawed approach to functional claims. 
Prohibiting courts from considering the requirements or conditions 
of § 112 presumes that courts are doing so in the first place. This 
presumption misunderstands why courts invalidate functional 
software claims. Courts do so because they consider software 
functions to be inherently abstract, not because the claims are 
unclear in scope or lack written description support. Under this 
view, a software function represents the idea of performing tasks on 
generic computer components without actually explaining how to 
do it. They are the digital equivalent of “a machine that applies 
Bernoulli’s principle to fly.” Although functional claims might also 
raise § 112 issues, that does not mean they are otherwise eligible 
under § 101. Therefore, even if Congress adopts the ABA’s 
proposal, courts could continue to invalidate functional software 
claims under the standard set forth by Bilski and Alice. 
B. Extending the Legislative Compromise under Section 112 (f) to 
Patent Eligibility 
Ultimately, the AIPLA-IPO and ABA proposals do not resolve 
underlying disputes about functional software claims, nor do they 
address judicial concerns that such claims will hinder innovation. 
As an alternative, some have proposed tackling functional software 
claiming more directly by incorporating the requirements of § 112(f) 
into the patent eligibility determination.336 Under this alternative 
approach, if a patent recites an ineligible software function, then 
courts will limit the claim to whatever software code or algorithms 
are disclosed in the embodiments.337 As one commentator argues, 
“[p]reemption concerns [under Section 101] may be addressed 
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adequately by disclosure-based limits on claim scope, rather than by 
precluding patentability in toto.”338 
One way to implement this proposal is through legislative 
amendment. For example, the existing language of § 112(f) could 
be appended to a new subsection under § 101. This subsection 
would state that “[a] claim directed to a judicially-recognized 
exception . . . shall be construed to cover the structures, materials, 
or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof . . . .”339 
A legislative fix, however, may be unnecessary if courts take a more 
expansive approach of means-plus-function claims. Section 112(f) 
applies to claims that recite “a specified function without the recital 
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof.”340 This language 
could theoretically cover a wide swath of functional software claims 
that courts have found ineligible under § 101. Stated differently, if a 
claim would otherwise run afoul of § 101 because it is drafted in a 
purely functional manner, courts could find that such a claim 
invokes § 112(f) and narrowly construe the claim to the disclosed 
embodiments only. 
The trend towards relaxing the standard for construing claims as 
means-plus-function terms already started with the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Williamson, which overturned the strong presumption 
that patentees only invoke § 112(f) if they use specific language like 
“means for.”341 Presently, however, the impact of Williamson is 
likely blunted by the courts’ willingness to invalidate functional 
software claims under § 101 altogether without reaching the 
§ 112(f) question. Courts could invoke § 112 to address judicial 
concerns about overbroad or vague software patents, instead of 
invalidating such claims under § 101. 
There are several benefits to limiting functional software claims 
to the disclosed embodiments. First, narrowing functional software 
claim to a specific algorithm would make the claim less abstract. 
The Federal Circuit has reasoned that claims which are limited to a 
specific means for performing a claimed function are more likely to 
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be patent-eligible.342 For example, in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 
the Federal Circuit held that a claim directed to storing tabular data 
was patent-eligible in part because the claim expressly used means-
plus-function language.343 Thus, “the claims are not simply directed 
to any form of storing tabular data, but instead are specifically 
directed to a self-referential table for a computer database.”344 The 
patent did not involve just “general-purpose computer components 
[that] are added post-hoc to a fundamental economic practice or 
mathematical equation. Rather, the claims are directed to a specific 
implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts. 
Accordingly, [the court found] the claims at issue are not directed to 
an abstract idea.”345 
Second, this proposed approach would address concerns about 
preemption that underpin judicial decisions on patent eligibility. In 
Morse, the Supreme Court invalidated Morse’s patent for using 
electric current to generate characters or signs at a remote location 
because, for the purposes of infringement, “it matters not by what 
process or machinery the result is accomplished.”346 Likewise, the 
Court in Alice observed that allowing patentees to “claim any 
principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a computer 
system configured to implement the relevant concept” would 
broadly preempt the future use of those concepts.347 Limiting the 
claims to the algorithms and code described in the specification 
would obviate these concerns. In Morse, the patent would only cover 
the process and machines that Samuel Morse invented and 
disclosed.348 If a subsequent inventor develops a better telegraph, 
they would not be liable for infringement. Likewise, the patent in 
Alice would only cover any specific algorithms for intermediated 
settlement described in the specification. 
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Third, limiting the scope of functional software claims would 
also resolve the competing judicial approaches to functional 
software claims. As described in Section IV.C, some cases have held 
software functions are inherently abstract, such that a patent reciting 
purely functional language will fail § 101 regardless of what the 
specification discloses.349 By contrast, other cases look to the patent 
specification to determine if the claimed function is performed with 
patent-eligible technology.350 The proposed approach represents a 
compromise between these two lines of cases. Courts and the PTO 
must rely on the specification to determine if the claim is eligible, 
and, therefore, will not invalidate a claim simply because it recites a 
function or end result. On the other hand, functional software claims 
will be restricted in scope and cannot cover algorithms for 
performing the claimed function that are not disclosed in the 
specification. 
Despite these possible benefits, this approach may prove 
difficult for Article III courts to apply in practice. Section 112(f) is 
premised on the idea that courts can identify a corresponding 
structure or process in the specification to perform the claimed 
function. For software claims, the corresponding structure or 
process is usually an algorithm or software object.351 The problem, 
however, is that algorithms and software objects are essentially 
logical procedures for performing tasks.352 At bottom, they are still 
a series of functions. As Professor Kevin Collins observes, software 
“[a]lgorithms are recursive entities: algorithms have sub-algorithms, 
which have sub-sub-algorithms, etc.”353 In short, “software is 
functional all the way down.”354 
Given the recursive nature of software, courts must find a level 
of abstraction that satisfies § 101 and § 112(f). In other words, 
courts must “identify a bottom as a matter of policy—a level of 
generality below which a functional property of a software program 
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counts as metaphorical structure . . . .”355 This should be possible in 
theory. According to Professor Mark Lemley, there are “well-
understood class[es] of software objects” that could serve as the 
metaphorical “structure.”356 He further notes that the same 
theoretical problem exists in more conventional claims. That is, “[a] 
jackhammer functions too, but we have no trouble distinguishing the 
function it performs from the way in which it performs that function. 
The same can be said of software.”357 
Although it is likely possible to identify an “acceptable” level of 
abstraction for software functions, it remains an open question as to 
whether courts are institutionally equipped to do so. Professor 
Collins expressed doubt that an Article III court is capable of 
resolving this question with any consistency.358 He notes this inquiry 
would “require consultation with computer scientists to create a 
taxonomy of a variety of levels of abstraction at which the functional 
properties of a software program can be formulated.”359 And it would 
also require courts “to identify the level of abstraction at which 
algorithmic descriptions of software become sufficiently specific to 
count as the descriptions of the metaphorical structure of software 
inventions.”360 From an institutional standpoint, courts have 
questioned their own ability to resolve this type of policy question. 
In Benson, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he technological 
problems tendered in the many briefs before us indicate to us that 
considered action by the Congress is needed.”361 The Court in Flook 
noted how Congress should rely on empirical data to resolve 
“[d]ifficult questions of policy concerning the kinds of programs 
that may be appropriate for patent protection and the form and 
duration.”362 
From an institutional standpoint, the PTO is likely better suited 
to establish guidelines on what types of software algorithms connote 
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structure and which are merely functions.363 The PTO already 
employs thousands of employees, many of whom possess relevant 
scientific and technical training.364 Likewise, the agency has 
divisions dedicated to economic research and analysis that could 
evaluate the impact of whatever guidelines it develops regarding 
software patents.365 While giving this problem to the PTO seems 
sensible, the agency currently lacks legal authority to interpret 
§ 101.366 As a result, the PTO cannot promulgate legally binding 
rules on what types of software algorithms or functions are 
sufficiently concrete.367 Whether the PTO should be given 
substantive rulemaking authority over § 101 remains a contentious 
topic and is beyond the scope of this article.368 Opponents of giving 
substantive rulemaking authority to the PTO express concerns about 
institutional competence and agency capture.369 But at least for 
finding a workable approach to functional software claims, the PTO 
is likely best suited to resolve the proper level of abstraction for 
software. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Nearly two centuries of judicial decisions have expressed policy 
concerns about functional claims. And while Congress tried to 
resolve this issue in the 1952 Patent Act, the advent of general-
purpose computers raised new and unforeseen questions about 
functional claiming that courts are still grappling with. After Alice, 
the preferred solution among many judges is to invalidate functional 
software claims altogether. Reasonable minds might differ on 
whether this approach is a faithful application of § 101 and § 112. 
Nevertheless, these decisions reflect legitimate policy concerns 
about whether patentees can use functional software claiming to 
improperly tie up abstract ideas. Legislative action to address 
patentable subject matter should not ignore these concerns. And yet, 
the current set of proposed amendments to § 101 would dramatically 
limit judicial discretion without resolving questions about the 
preemptive effects of software patents. Moreover, by rigidifying the 
patent eligibility standard, the proposed legislative reforms could 
leave courts and the PTO less capable of contending with issues 
raised by new and unforeseen technological developments. 
 
